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Abstract
We investigate quantum authentication schemes constructed from quantum error-correcting codes.
We show that if the code has a property called purity testing, then the resulting authentication
scheme guarantees the integrity of ciphertexts, not just plaintexts. On top of that, if the code
is strong purity testing, the authentication scheme also allows the encryption key to be recycled,
partially even if the authentication rejects. Such a strong notion of authentication is useful in
a setting where multiple ciphertexts can be present simultaneously, such as in interactive or
delegated quantum computation. With these settings in mind, we give an explicit code (based
on the trap code) that is strong purity testing but, contrary to other known strong-purity-testing
codes, allows for natural computation on ciphertexts.
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1 Introduction
A central topic in cryptography is authentication: how can we make sure that a message
remains unaltered when we send it over an insecure channel? How do we protect a file
from being corrupted when it is stored someplace where adversarial parties can potentially
access it? And, especially relevant in the current era of cloud computing, how can we let an
untrusted third party compute on such authenticated data?
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Following extensive research on authentication of classical data, starting with the seminal
work by Wegman and Carter [17], several schemes have been proposed for authenticating
quantum states [5, 1, 6]. One notable such scheme is the trap code [6], an encoding scheme
that surrounds the data with dummy qubits that function as traps, revealing any unauthorized
attempts to alter the plaintext data. A client holding the classical encryption key can guide
a third party in performing computations directly on the ciphertext by sending input-
independent auxiliary quantum states that help bypass the traps, and updating the classical
key during the computation. The result is an authenticated output ciphertext.
The trap code distinguishes itself from other quantum authentication schemes in two ways.
First, individually-authenticated input qubits can be entangled during the computation, but
still be de-authenticated individually. This contrasts for example the Clifford code [1], where
de-authentication needs to happen simultaneously on all qubits that were involved in the
computation, including any auxiliary ones. Second, the trap code allows for ‘authenticated
measurements’: if a third party measures a ciphertext, the client can verify the authenticity
of the result from the classical measurement outcomes only. It is not known how to perform
authenticated measurements on other codes. These two qualities make the trap code uniquely
suited for quantum computing on authenticated data. It was originally designed for its use
in quantum one-time programs [6], but has found further applications in zero-knowledge
proofs for QMA [7], and in quantum homomorphic encryption with verification [2].
The extraordinary structure of the trap code is simultaneously its weakness: an adversary
can learn information about the secret key by altering the ciphertext in a specific way, and
observing whether or not the result is accepted by the client. Thus, to ensure security
after de-authentication, the key needs to be refreshed before another quantum state is
authenticated. This need for a refresh inhibits the usefulness of the trap code, because
computation on multiple qubits under the trap code requires these qubits to be authenticated
under overlapping secret keys.
In recent years, several works have refined the original definition of quantum authentication
by Barnum et al. [5]. The trap code is secure under the weakest of these definitions [10],
where only authenticity of the plaintext is guaranteed. But, as argued, it is not under the
stronger ‘total authentication’ [12], where no information about the key is leaked if the client
accepts the authentication. As Portmann mentions in his work on authentication with key
recycling in the abstract-cryptography framework [15], it is not even clear whether the trap
code can be regarded as a scheme with partial key leakage, as defined in [12], because of
the adaptive way in which it can be attacked. In a different direction, Alagic, Gagliardoni,
and Majenz [3] define a notion of quantum ciphertext authentication (QCA), where also
the integrity of the ciphertext is guaranteed, and not just that of the plaintext. Ciphertext
authentication is incomparable with total authentication: neither one implies the other.
Before the current work, it was unknown whether the trap code authenticates ciphertexts.
Barnum et al. [5] built schemes for authentication of quantum data based on quantum
error-correcting codes that are purity testing, meaning that any bit or phase flip on the message
is detected with high probability. Portmann [15], working in the abstract-cryptography
framework, showed that if the underlying code satisfies a stronger requirement called strong
purity testing, the resulting authentication scheme allows for complete key recycling in the
accept case, and for partial key recycling in the reject case. The trap code can be seen as a
purity-testing error-correcting code, but it is not strong purity testing. This is consistent
with the observation that keys in the trap code cannot be recycled.
Quantum plaintext authentication with key recycling has been studied before. Oppenheim
and Horodecki [14] showed partial key recycling for schemes based on purity testing codes,
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Figure 1 Overview of different definitions of quantum authentication. Three previously defined
notions (in gray) and their relations were already known: DNS [10] is strictly weaker than GYZ [12]
(total authentication) and QCA [3]. These last two are incomparable: there exist schemes that satisfy
either one, but not the other. On the bottom right, our new definition QCA-R is displayed: it is
strictly stronger than both GYZ and QCA. For justifications of the relations displayed in this figure,
refer to pages 6 (for DNS 9 GYZ), 6 (for DNS 9 QCA), 6 (for GYZ = QCA), and 9 (for GYZ 9
QCA-R and QCA 9 QCA-R).
under a weaker notion of security. Hayden, Leung, and Mayers [13] adapted Barnum et
al.’s construction to use less key and show its authenticating properties in the universal-
composability framework. Fehr and Salvail [11] develop a quantum authentication scheme
for classical messages that achieves the same key-recycling rate as Portmann [15], but is not
based on quantum error-correction and only requires the client to prepare and measure.
1.1 Our contributions
We investigate the relation between (strong) purity testing and quantum ciphertext authenti-
cation (QCA), and give a variation on the trap code with stronger security guarantees. We
specify our contributions in more detail below.
Section 3: Definition of quantum ciphertext authentication with key recycling (QCA-R).
We give a new definition for quantum authentication, QCA-R, that provides both ciphertext
authentication and key recycling, and is thereby strictly stronger than existing definitions.
See Figure 1 for a comparison of different notions of authentication.
Section 3.1: Purity-testing codes give rise to QCA-secure encryption. We prove that
Barnum et al.’s canonical construction of authentication schemes from purity-testing codes [5]
produces schemes that are not only plaintext authenticating, but also ciphertext authenticat-
ing (QCA). The proof generalizes the proofs in [8] that the trap code and Clifford code are
plaintext authenticating, using a different (but still efficient) simulator. Note that our result
immediately implies that the trap code is ciphertext authenticating.
Section 3.1: Strong-purity-testing codes give rise to QCA-R-secure encryption. Purity-
testing codes are generally not sufficient for constructing QCA-R schemes, but strong-purity-
testing codes are: we prove that Barnum et al.’s canonical construction achieves QCA-R
when a strong-purity-testing code is used as a resource. In case the authenticated message is
accepted, the entire key can be reused. Otherwise, all but the quantum-one-time-pad key
can be reused.
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Section 4: A strong-purity-testing version of the trap code. We give an explicit con-
struction of a strong-purity-testing code that is inspired by the trap code. In this strong trap
code, the underlying error-correcting code is not only applied to the data qubits, but also to
the trap qubits. The result is a quantum authentication scheme which satisfies the strong
notion of QCA-R, but still maintains the computational properties that make the original
trap code such a useful scheme.
Section 5: Security under parallel encryption. To illustrate the power of recycling key
in the reject case, we consider a setting with a different type of key reuse: reusing (part
of) a key immediately to authenticate a second qubit, even before the first qubit is verified.
We show that, if multiple qubits are simultaneously authenticated using a scheme that is
based on a strong-purity-testing code, then de-authenticating some of these qubits does not
jeopardize the security of the others, even if their keys overlap. This property is especially
important when using the computational capabilities of the strong trap code, since computing
on authenticated qubits needs multiple qubits to use overlapping keys.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
We use conventional notation for unitary matrices (U or V ), pure states (|ψ〉 or |ϕ〉), and
mixed states (ρ or σ). We reserve the symbol τ for the completely mixed state I/d, and |Φ+〉
for the EPR pair 1√2 (|00〉 + |11〉). The m-qubit Pauli group is denoted with Pm, and its
elements with P` where ` is a 2m-bit string indicating the bit-flip and phase-flip positions. By
convention, P0 is identity. The X-weight (, Y-weight, or Z-weight) of a Pauli is the number
of qubits on which it acts as an X (, Y, or Z) operation.
We often specify the register(s) on which a unitary acts by gray superscripts (as in UR);
it is implicit that the unitary acts as identity on all other registers. The trace norm of
a density matrix ρ is written as ‖ρ‖tr. The diamond norm of a channel Ψ is written as
‖Ψ‖ := supρ‖(I⊗Ψ)(ρ)‖tr. If we want to talk about the distance between two channels Ψ
and Ψ′, we use the normalized quantity 12‖Ψ−Ψ′‖, which we refer to as the diamond-norm
distance.
2.2 Quantum authentication
A secret-key quantum encryption scheme consists of three (efficient) algorithms: key genera-
tion KeyGen, encryption Encryptk, and decryption Decryptk. Throughout this work, we will
assume that KeyGen selects a key k uniformly at random from some set K; our results still
hold if the key is selected according to some other distribution. By Lemma B.9 in [4], we
can characterize the encryption and decryption maps as being of the form
Encryptk : ρM 7→ UMTk (ρ⊗ σTk )(U†k)MT , (1)
Decryptk : ρMT 7→ TrT
[
(Πacck )T
(
U†kρU
MT
k
)
(Πacck )T
]
+DMTk
[
(Πrejk )
T
(
U†kρU
MT
k
)
(Πrejk )
T
]
. (2)
Here, M is the message register, σk is some key-dependent tag state in register T , and Uk
is a unitary acting on both. Πacck and Π
rej
k are orthogonal projectors onto the support of
σk and its complement, respectively. Finally, Dk is any channel: we will usually assume
that Dk(·) = TrMT (·) ⊗ |⊥〉〈⊥|M , i.e., it traces out the message and tag register entirely,
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and replaces the message with some dummy state that signifies a reject. Because of the
above characterization, we will often talk about encryption schemes as a keyed collection
{(Uk, σk)}k∈K of unitaries and tag states.
There are several definitions of the authentication of quantum data. All definitions involve
some parameter ε; unless otherwise specified, we require ε to be negligibly small in the size
of the ciphertext.
The simplest definition is that of plaintext authentication, presented in [10] (although
their definition was in phrased terms of the trace norm), where no guarantees are given about
the recyclability of the key.
I Definition 1 (Quantum plaintext authentication (DNS) [10]). A quantum encryption scheme
{(Uk, σk)}k∈K is plaintext ε-authenticating (or ε-DNS) if for all CP maps A (acting on the
message register M , tag register T , and a side-information register R), there exist CP maps
Sacc and Srej such that S := Sacc + Srej is trace-preserving, and
1
2
∥∥∥∥E
k
[
Decryptk ◦ AMTR ◦ Encryptk
]MR − (IM ⊗ SRacc + |⊥〉〈⊥|M (TrM ⊗ SRrej))∥∥∥∥

≤ ε,
where Encryptk and Decryptk are of the form of equations (1) and (2).
The simulator in Definition 1 reflects the ideal functionality of an authentication scheme:
in the accept case, the message remains untouched, whereas in the reject case, it is completely
discarded and replaced with the fixed state |⊥〉〈⊥|. Any action on the side-information
register R is allowed.
I The trap code. An example of a plaintext-authenticating scheme is the trap code [6].
This scheme encrypts single-qubit messages by applying a fixed distance-d CSS code E to the
message, producing n physical qubits, and then appending 2n “trap" qubits (n computational-
basis traps in the state |0〉〈0|, and n Hadamard-basis traps in the state |+〉〈+|). The resulting
3n qubits are permuted in a random fashion according to a key k1, and one-time padded
with a second key k2. At decryption, the one-time pad and permutation are removed, the
traps are measured in their respective bases, and the syndrome of the CSS code is checked.2
The trap code, for a key k = (k1, k2), is characterized by Uk = Pk2pik1(E ⊗ I⊗n ⊗ H⊗n) and
σk = |0〉〈0|⊗(3n−1), where pik1 is a unitary that permutes the 3n qubits. A proof that the
trap code is plaintext (2/3)d/2-authenticating can be found in e.g. [8].
Another definition of quantum authentication is presented in [12] (where it is called
‘total authentication’): in this definition, the key should be recyclable in the accept case.
This is modeled by revealing the key to the environment after use, and requiring that it is
indistinguishable from a completely fresh and uncorrelated key. If that is the case, it can be
recycled for another round.
I Definition 2 (Quantum plaintext authentication with key recycling (GYZ) [12]). A quantum
encryption scheme {(Uk, σk)}k∈K is plaintext ε-authenticating with key recycling (or ε-GYZ) if
for all CP maps A (acting on the message register M , tag register T , and a side-information
register R), there exist CP maps Sacc and Srej such that S := Sacc + Srej is trace preserving,
2 We differ from the analysis by Broadbent and Wainewright [8] in that we consider the variant that uses
error detection instead of error correction on the data qubits.
TQC 2018
1:6 Quantum Ciphertext Authentication and Key Recycling with the Trap Code
and
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥Ek
[
ρMR 7→ TrT
(
Πacck U
†
k
(
AMTR
(
Uk(ρ⊗ σTk )U†k
))
UkΠacck
)
⊗ |k〉〈k|
]
− (IM ⊗ SRacc ⊗ τK)
∥∥∥∥∥

≤ ε.
Note that Definition 2 only specifies what should happen in the accept case. Nevertheless, it
is a strictly stronger definition than DNS authentication [4].
The trap code is not plaintext ε-authenticating with key recycling for sub-constant ε. To
see this, consider an adversary A that applies X to (only) the first qubit of the MT register.
With probability 2/3, the attack lands on a data qubit or a |0〉〈0| trap, and is detected. Thus,
in the real accept scenario, the key register will contain a mixture of only those keys that
permute a |+〉〈+| into the first position. All other keys are diminished by the projector
Πacck . Since the ideal scenario contains a mixture of all possible keys in the key register,
the difference between the two channels is considerable. In practice, if an adversary learns
whether the authentication succeeded, she gets information about the positions of the traps.
I The Clifford code. A simple yet powerful code that authenticates plaintexts with key
recycling is the Clifford code [1]. In this code, we fix a parameter t, and set σk = |0t〉〈0t|
for all k, and Uk a uniformly random Clifford on t + 1 qubits. The Clifford code (and
any authentication code that is based on a 2-design) is plaintext ε-authenticating with key
recycling for ε = O(2−t) [4].
Strengthening Definition 1 in a different direction, Alagic, Gagliardoni, and Majenz
recently introduced the notion of quantum ciphertext authentication [3]. This notion does
not limit the amount of key leaked, but requires that if authentication accepts, the entire
ciphertext was completely untouched. Ciphertext authentication is used as an ingredient for
quantum encryption that is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks [3].
I Definition 3 (Quantum ciphertext authentication (QCA) [3]). A quantum encryption scheme
{(Uk, σk =
∑
r pk,r|ϕk,r〉〈ϕk,r|)}k∈K is ciphertext ε-authenticating (or ε-QCA) if it is plaintext
ε-authenticating as in Definition 1, and the accepting simulator Sacc is of the form
Sacc : ρR 7→ E
k′,r
[
〈ϕk′,r|T 〈Φ+|M1M2U†k′AM1TR
(
UM1Tk′ ρ
RM1M2T
k′,r U
†
k′
)
Uk′ |ϕk′,r〉|Φ+〉
]
.
where ρk′,r := ρR ⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|M1M2 ⊗ |ϕk′,r〉〈ϕk′,r|T is the input state before (simulated)
encryption.
In QCA, the accepting simulator tests whether the message remains completely untouched
by encrypting half of an EPR pair (stored in register M1) as a ‘dummy message’, under a
key k′ that it generates itself. It remembers the randomness r used in creating the tag state
σk, so that it can test very accurately whether the tag state was untouched. Because Sacc
remembers the randomness, a scheme that appends a qubit at the end of its ciphertexts, but
never checks its state at decryption time, cannot be ciphertext authenticating. The Clifford
code is QCA [3], as is the trap code (see Section 3.1).
In general, key recycling as in Definition 2 does not imply QCA. To see this, take any
scheme {(Uk, σk)}k∈K that is plaintext authenticating with key recycling, and alter it by
appending a qubit in the fully mixed state to σk (and extending Uk to act as identity on
this qubit). This scheme still satisfies Definition 2, but cannot be ciphertext authenticating,
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because attacks on this last qubit are not noticed in the real scenario. Conversely, not all
ciphertext-authenticating schemes have key recycling. Take any scheme that is QCA, and
alter it by adding one extra bit b of key, and setting σkb := σk ⊗ |b〉〈b| and Ukb := Uk ⊗ I,
effectively appending the bit of key at the end of the ciphertext. This scheme still satisfies
Definition 3, but leaks at least one bit of key.3 For an overview of the relations between DNS,
GYZ, and QCA, refer to Figure 1 on page 3.
2.3 (Strong) purity testing in quantum error correction
An [[n,m]] quantum error-correcting code (QECC), characterized by a unitary operator V ,
encodes a message ρ consisting of m qubits into a codeword V (ρ ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|)V † consisting
of n qubits, by appending t := n −m tags |0〉〈0|, and applying the unitary V . Decoding
happens by undoing the unitary V , and measuring the tag register in the computational
basis. The measurement outcome is called the syndrome: an all-zero syndrome indicates that
no error-correction is necessary. In this work, we will only use the error-detection property
of QECCs, and will not worry about how to correct the message if a non-zero syndrome is
measured. If that happens, we will simply discard the message (i.e., reject).
For any bit string x ∈ {0, 1}m, let |xL〉 (for “logical |x〉") denote a valid encoding of |x〉,
i.e., a state that will decode to |x〉 without error. A defining feature of any QECC is its
distance: the amount of bit and/or phase flips required to turn one valid codeword into
another. If we want to be explicit about the distance d of an [[n,m]] code, we will refer to it
as an [[n,m, d]] code.
I Definition 4 (Distance). The distance of an [[n,m]] code is the minimum weight of a Pauli
P such that P |xL〉 = |yL〉 for some x 6= y, with x, y ∈ {0, 1}m.
In a cryptographic setting, it can be useful to select a code from a set of codes {Vk}k∈K
for some key set K. We will again assume that the key k is selected uniformly at random.
Following [5] and [15], we restrict our attention to codes for which applying a Pauli to a
codeword is equivalent to applying a (possibly different) Pauli directly to the message and
tag register. In other words, the unitary V must be such that for any P` ∈ Pm+t, there exists
a P`′ ∈ Pm+t and a θ ∈ R such that P`V = eiθV P`′ . With our attention restricted to codes
with this property, we can meaningfully define the following property:
I Definition 5 (Purity testing [5]). A set of codes {Vk}k∈K is purity testing with error ε if
for any Pauli P` ∈ Pm+t\{I⊗(m+t)},
Pr
k
[
V †k P`Vk ∈ (Pm\{I⊗m})⊗ {I,Z}⊗t
]
≤ ε.
In words, for any non-identity Pauli, the probability (over the key) that the Pauli alters the
message but is not detected (i.e., no tag bit is flipped) is upper bounded by ε.
The trap code (see page 5) based on an [[n, 1, d]] CSS code, without the final quantum
one-time pad, is a purity-testing code with error (2/3)d/2 [6]. In our framework, the trap code
is described as a QECC with m = 1, t = 3n− 1, and Vk = pik(E ⊗ I⊗n ⊗ H⊗n).
Note that purity-testing codes do not necessarily detect all Pauli attacks with high
probability: it may well be that a Pauli attack remains undetected, because it acts as
identity on the message. Flipping the first bit of a trap-code ciphertext is an example of
3 We thank Gorjan Alagic and Christian Majenz for providing these example schemes that show the
separation between Definitions 2 and 3.
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such an attack: it remains undetected with probability 1/3 (if it hits a |+〉 trap), but unless
it is detected, it also does not alter the message. An attacker may use this fact to learn
information about the permutation pik by observing whether or not the QECC detects an
error.
The above exploitation of purity-testing codes has led Portmann to consider a stronger
notion of purity testing that should allow for keys to be safely reusable. In this definition,
even the Paulis that act as identity on the message should be detected:
I Definition 6 (Strong purity testing [15]). A set of codes {Vk}k∈K is strong purity testing
with error ε if for any Pauli P` ∈ Pm+t\{I⊗(m+t)},
Pr
k
[
V †k P`Vk ∈ Pm ⊗ {I,Z}⊗t
]
≤ ε.
The Clifford code is strong purity testing with error 2−t, as is any other unitary 2-
design [15]. As informally discussed above, the trap code is not strong purity testing for any
small ε.
Barnum et al. [5] described a canonical method of turning a QECC set {Vk1}k1∈K1 into
a symmetric-key encryption scheme. The encryption key k consists of two parts: the key
k1 ∈ K1 for the QECC, and an additional one-time pad key k2 ∈ {0, 1}2(m+t). The encryption
map is then defined by setting Uk1,k2 := Pk2Vk1 , and σk1,k2 = |0t〉〈0t|. Since σk1,k2 is key-
independent, the projectors Πacc = |0t〉〈0t| and Πrej = I − |0t〉〈0t| are key-independent as
well. In Construction 1, the complete protocol is described. In [6], protocols of this form are
called “encode-encrypt schemes”.
Construction 1 Barnum et al.’s canonical construction [5] of a symmetric-key encryption scheme
from an [[m+ t,m]] quantum error-correcting code {Vk1}k1∈K1 .
Generate keys: sample k1 ← K1 and k2 ← K2 = {0, 1}2(m+t).
Encrypt: ρM 7→ PMTk2 VMTk1 (ρM ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|T )VMTk1 PMTk2 .
Decrypt: ρMT 7→ 〈0t|
(
V †k1P
†
k2
ρPk2Vk1
)
|0t〉+ |⊥〉〈⊥|M ⊗ TrM
[∑
i6=0t
〈i|
(
V †k1P
†
k2
ρPk2Vk1
)
|i〉
]
When using Construction 1 with a strong-purity-testing code, plaintext authentication
with key recycling is achieved, even with partial key recycling in the reject case [15]. If just a
purity-testing code is used for the construction, the resulting encryption scheme is plaintext
authenticating [5], but not necessarily with key recycling (the trap code is a counterexample).
3 Quantum ciphertext authentication with key recycling (QCA-R)
In this section, we will define a notion of quantum authentication that is stronger than all of
Definitions 1, 2, and 3. We will show that Construction 1, when used with a strong-purity-
testing code, results in an authentication scheme in this new, stronger sense.
I Definition 7 (Quantum ciphertext authentication with key recycling (QCA-R)). A quantum
encryption scheme {(Uk, σk =
∑
r pk,r|ϕk,r〉〈ϕk,r|)}k∈K is ciphertext ε-authenticating with
key recycling (or ε-QCA-R), with key recycling function f , if for all CP maps A (acting on
the message register M , tag register T , and a side-information register R), there exists a CP
map Srej such that
R : ρMR 7→ Ek
[
TrT
(
Πacc
(
U†kAMTR
(
UMTk (ρ⊗ σTk )U†k
)
Uk
)
Πacc
)
⊗ |k〉〈k|
+ |⊥〉〈⊥|M ⊗ TrMT
(
Πrej
(
U†kAMTR
(
UMTk (ρ⊗ σTk )U†k
)
Uk
)
Πrej
)
⊗ |f(k)〉〈f(k)|
]
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is ε-close in diamond-norm distance to the ideal channel,
I : ρMR 7→ (IM ⊗ Sacc) (ρMR)⊗ τK + |⊥〉〈⊥|M ⊗ Srej(ρR)⊗ Ek [|f(k)〉〈f(k)|] ,
where S := Sacc + Srej is trace preserving, and Sacc is as in Definition 3 of QCA, that is,
Sacc : ρR 7→ E
k′,r
[
〈ϕk′,r|T 〈Φ+|M1M2U†k′AM1TR
(
UM1Tk′ ρ
RM1M2T
k′,r U
†
k′
)
Uk′ |ϕk′,r〉|Φ+〉
]
for ρk′,r := ρR ⊗ |Φ+〉〈Φ+|M1M2 ⊗ |ϕk′,r〉〈ϕk′,r|T .
The first condition (closeness of the real and ideal channel) is a strengthening of Defi-
nition 2: following Portmann [15], we also consider which part of the key can be recycled
in the reject case. If the recycling function f is the identity function, all of the key can be
recycled. If f maps all keys to the empty string, then no constraints are put on key leakage
in the reject case.
QCA-R strengthens both GYZ and QCA, but not vice versa: the schemes from Section 2.2
that separate the two older notions are immediately examples of schemes that are GYZ or
QCA but cannot be QCA-R.
3.1 Constructing QCA-R from any strong-purity-testing code
It was already observed that if a set of quantum error-correcting codes {Vk1}k1∈K1 is purity
testing, then the encryption scheme resulting from Construction 1 is plaintext authenticat-
ing [5]. We strengthen this result by showing that the construction turns purity-testing codes
into ciphertext-authenticating schemes (Theorem 8), and strong-purity-testing codes into
QCA-R schemes (Theorem 9). Only purity testing is in general not enough to achieve QCA-R:
the trap code is again a counterexample.
I Theorem 8. Let {Vk1}k1∈K1 be a purity-testing code with error ε. The encryption scheme
resulting from Construction 1 is quantum ciphertext ε-authenticating (ε-QCA).
Sketch. In order to prove Theorem 8, we define a simulator that runs the adversary on
encrypted halves of EPR pairs, so that the simulator is of the correct form for Definition 3.
We prove that the ideal and the real channel are close by considering the accept and the
reject cases separately, and by showing that they are both ε/2-close. First, we decompose
the adversarial attack into Paulis by Pauli twirling [9] it with the quantum-one-time-pad
encryption from Construction 1. In the accept case, the difference between the real and the
ideal scenario lies in those attacks that are accepted in the real case, but not in the ideal
case. These are exactly those Paulis that, after conjugation with the key k1 that indexes the
purity-testing code, are in the set (Pm⊗{I,Z}⊗t)\({I⊗m}⊗{I,Z}⊗t) = (Pm\{I⊗m})⊗{I,Z}⊗t.
The purity-testing property guarantees that the probability over k1 of a Pauli attack landing
in this set is small. The reject case is similar. J
A full proof of Theorem 8 can be found in the full version. The proof of Theorem 9 below
uses the same techniques. It follows the proof structure of [15, Theorem 3.5], but with a
simulator that is suitable for QCA-R.
I Theorem 9. Let {Vk1}k1∈K1 be a strong-purity-testing code with error ε. The encryption
scheme resulting from Construction 1 is quantum ciphertext (
√
ε+ 32ε)-authenticating with
key recycling (ε-QCA-R), with recycling function f(k1, k2) := k1.
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Proof. Let A be an adversary as in Definition 7. Define a simulator S on the side-information
register R as follows: prepare an EPR pair |Φ+〉〈Φ+| in the register M1M2 and encrypt
the first qubit using a freshly sampled key (k′1, k′2) ∈ K := K1 × K2 (that is, initialize the
tag register T in the state |0t〉〈0t|, and apply Pk′2Vk′1 to M1T ). Then, run the adversary on
the registers M1TR, keeping M2 to the side. Afterwards, run the decryption procedure by
undoing the encryption unitary and measuring whether the registers M1M2T are still in the
state |Φ+, 0t〉〈Φ+, 0t| (= |Φ+〉〈Φ+| ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|). If so, accept, and if not, reject. Note that this
simulator is of the required form in the accept case (see Definition 7).
We show that for this simulator, the distance 12‖I−R‖ between the ideal and the real
channel is upper bounded by
√
ε + 32ε. Let ρMRE be any quantum state on the message
register, side-information register, and an environment register E. Let UMTR be a unitary4
map representing the adversarial channel A, and let µrealk1,k2 and µidealk1,k2 be the effective output
states in the real and ideal world, respectively:
µrealk1,k2 := V
†
k1
P †k2U
MTRPMTk2 V
MT
k1 (ρ⊗ |0t〉〈0t|)V †k1P
†
k2
U†Pk2Vk1 , (3)
µidealk1,k2 := V
†
k1
P †k2U
M1TRPM1Tk2 V
M1T
k1
(ρ⊗ |0t,Φ+〉〈0t,Φ+|)V †k1P
†
k2
U†Pk2Vk1 . (4)
Then we can write the result of the real and the ideal channels as
R(ρ) = E
k1,k2
[
〈0t|Tµrealk1,k2 |0t〉 ⊗ |k1k2〉〈k1k2|
+ |⊥〉〈⊥|M ⊗ TrM
∑
i 6=0t
〈i|Tµrealk1,k2 |i〉
⊗ |k1〉〈k1|], (5)
I(ρ) = E
k′1,k
′
2
[
〈Φ+, 0t|M1M2Tµidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+0t〉 ⊗ τK
+ |⊥〉〈⊥|M ⊗ TrM
 ∑
i 6=(Φ+,0t)
〈i|M1M2Tµidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
⊗ τK1
]
. (6)
These expressions are obtained simply by plugging in the description of the authentication
scheme (see Construction 1) and the simulator into the channels of Definition 7. Since the
accept states are orthogonal to the reject states in the M register, and since the key states
are all mutually orthogonal, the distance 12‖I(ρ)−R(ρ)‖tr can be written as
E
k1,k2
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
(
〈Φ+, 0t|µidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+, 0t〉
)
− 〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
+ E
k1
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
TrM ∑
i6=(0t,Φ+)
〈i|µidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
−E
k2
TrM ∑
i6=0t
〈i|µrealk1,k2 |i〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
. (7)
For a complete derivation, see the full version. We can thus focus on bounding the two
terms in equation (7), for accept and reject, separately. Note the difference between the two
terms: in the reject case, the expectation over the one-time pad key k2 does not have to
4 We can assume unitarity without loss of generality: if the adversary’s actions are not unitary, we can
dilate the channel into a unitary one by adding another environment and tracing it out afterwards. In
the proof, the environment takes on the same role as the side-information register R, so we omit it for
simplicity.
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be brought outside of the trace norm, since it is not recycled after a reject. This will make
bounding the second term in equation (7) the simpler of the two, so we will start with that
one.
Decompose the attack as UMTR =
∑
` α`P
MT
` ⊗ UR` . Intuitively, the two states inside
the second trace norm differ on those Paulis P` that are rejected in the ideal scenario, but
not in the real one. The strong-purity-testing property promises that these Paulis are very
few. However, we have to be careful, because the simulator independently generates its own
set of keys. We will now bound the second term in equation (7) more formally.
By rearranging sums, commuting Paulis, and applying projectors (for details: see the full
version), we can rewrite the second term inside the trace norm, the state in the real reject
case for k1, as
E
k2
TrM ∑
i 6=0t
〈i|µrealk1,k2 |i〉
 = TrM
 ∑
` : V †
k1
P`Vk1 6∈Preal
|α`|2 UR` ρMRU†`
 , (8)
where Preal contains the Paulis that are accepted by the real projector, i.e., Preal := Pm ⊗
{I,Z}⊗t. Similarly, defining Pideal := {I⊗m} ⊗ {I,Z}⊗t to be the set of Paulis that are allowed
by the ideal projector, the resulting state in the reject case is
E
k′1,k
′
2
TrM ∑
i6=(0t,Φ+)
〈i|µidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
 = TrM

∑
` 6=0
E
k′1∈K1
V †
k′1
P`Vk′1
6∈Pideal
|α`|2 UR` ρMRU†`
 (9)
≈ε TrM
∑
` 6=0
E
k′1∈K1
|α`|2 UR` ρMRU†`
 , (10)
where the approximation sign means that the trace distance between the two states is
upper bounded by ε. The closeness follows from the strong-purity-testing property of the
code: the two states differ in those keys k′1 for which V
†
k′1
P`Vk′1 ∈ Pideal ⊆ Preal, and for any
non-identity Pauli P`, this set is small by strong purity testing. Combined with the facts
that tr(U`ρU†` ) = 1 and
∑
` |α`|2 = 1, it follows that the states in equations (9) and (10) are
ε-close. Note that none of the terms in equation (10) depends on k′1, so we can remove the
expectation over it.
Applying the triangle inequality (twice), the second term in equation (7) is found to be
small:
E
k1
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
TrM ∑
i 6=(0t,Φ+)
〈i|µidealk′1,k′2 |i〉
−E
k2
TrM ∑
i6=0t
〈i|µrealk1,k2 |i〉
∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
(11)
≤ ε2 +Ek1
1
2
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥TrM
 ∑
` : V †
k1
P`Vk1∈Preal\{I⊗(m+t)}
|α`|2 U`ρU†`

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
tr
(12)
≤ ε2 +
1
2Ek1
∑
` : V †
k1
P`Vk1∈Preal\{I⊗(m+t)}
|α`|2 , (13)
which we can upper bound by ε by applying the strong-purity-testing property once more.
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Next, we bound the first term of equation (7): the difference between the ideal and the
real channel in the accept case. The strategy is identical to the reject case that we just
treated, but because we want to recycle both k1 and k2 in the accept case, we have to be
more careful. The state in the real scenario, 〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉, cannot be rewritten into the
compact form of, e.g., equation (8), because we cannot average over the Pauli key k2. Using
a technical lemma from [15] and Jensen’s inequality in order to take the expectation over the
keys inside, we obtain the bound
E
k1,k2
∥∥∥∥∥ Ek′1,k′2
(
〈Φ+, 0t|µidealk′1,k′2 |Φ
+, 0t〉
)
− 〈0t|µrealk1,k2 |0t〉
∥∥∥∥∥
tr
≤ ε2 +
√
ε. (14)
For a complete derivation, see the full version.
We have now upper bounded 12‖I(ρ)−R(ρ)‖tr ≤
√
ε+ 32ε for any state ρMRE , resulting
in 12‖I−R‖ ≤
√
ε+ 32ε, as desired. J
4 A strong-purity-testing variation on the trap code
Theorem 9 already gives us a quantum-ciphertext-authenticating code with key recycling:
the Clifford code. However, the Clifford code is not very well suited for quantum computing
on authenticated data. Although all Clifford-group operations can be performed easily
by updating the key client-side, it is not known how to perform non-Clifford gates and
measurements on the Clifford code. Moreover, if an entangling operation is performed on
two separately encoded qubits, their keys also have to be combined into a key for a single,
bigger ciphertext. This prevents output qubits from being decrypted individually.
In this section, we therefore present a strong-purity-testing variation on the trap code,
the strong trap code, which does allow for computation on the ciphertexts in a meaningful
and efficient way. By Theorem 9, this construction immediately gives rise to a ciphertext
authentication scheme with key recycling (QCA-R). Note that the strong trap code is also
secure in Portmann’s abstract-cryptography definition of quantum plaintext authentication
with key recycling [15].
4.1 Benign distance and weight sparsity
The strong trap code requires the existence of a family of quantum error-correcting codes
with two specific properties: a high benign distance, and weight sparsity. We specify these
properties here.
If a QECC has distance d, it is not necessarily able to detect all Pauli errors of weight
less than d. For example, if one of the qubits in a codeword is in the state |0〉, then a Pauli-Z
remains undetected. In general, any Pauli error that stabilizes all codewords will remain
undetected by the code. Of course, such an error does not directly cause harm or adds noise
to the state, because it effectively performs the identity operation. However, in an adversarial
setting, even such ‘benign’ Pauli errors indicate that someone tried to modify the state.
We consider an alternative distance measure for quantum error-correcting codes that
describes the lowest possible weight of a stabilizer:
I Definition 10 (Benign distance). The benign distance of an [[n,m]] code is the minimum
weight of a non-identity Pauli P` such that P`|xL〉 = |xL〉 for all x ∈ {0, 1}m. If such P` does
not exist, the benign distance is ∞.
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To distinguish the benign distance from the notion of difference defined in Definition 4, we
will often use the term conventional distance to refer to the latter.
The benign distance in a fixed relation to the conventional distance. For example, the
[[7, 4]] Steane code has distance 3, but benign distance 4. On the other hand, the [[49, 1]]
concatenated Steane code has distance 9, but a benign distance of only 4 (any non-identity
stabilizer for the [[7, 4]] Steane code is also a stabilizer on the [[49, 1]] code if it is concatenated
with identity on the other blocks). Even though the two quantities do not bound each other
in general, we observe that the benign distance of weakly self-dual CSS codes (i.e., CSS codes
constructed from a weakly self-dual classical code) grows with their conventional distance:
see the full version.
We define a second property of interest: weight sparsity. Intuitively, weight sparsity
means that for any set of X-, Y-, and Z-weights, randomly selecting a Pauli operator with
those weights only yields a stabilizer with very small probability. This probability should
shrink whenever the codeword length grows; for this reason, we consider weight sparsity as a
property of code families rather than of individual codes.
I Definition 11 (Weight-sparse code family). Let (Ei)i∈N be a family of quantum error-
correcting codes with parameters [[n(i),m(i), d(i)]]. For each i ∈ N, and for all non-negative
integers x, y, z such that x+ y + z ≤ n(i), let Ai(x, y, z) denote the set of n(i)-qubit Paulis
with X-weight x, Y-weight y, and Z-weight z. Let Bi(x, y, z) denote set of benign Paulis in
Ai(x, y, z).
The family (Ei)i∈N is weight-sparse if the function
f(i) := max
x+y+z≤n(i)
|Bi(x, y, z)|
|Ai(x, y, z)|
is negligible5 in n(i).
In the full version of this paper, we construct a weight-sparse family of weakly self-dual
CSS codes that have benign distance O(
√
n(i)), where n(i) is the codeword length of the
ith code in the family. The CSS codes are constructed from a punctured version of classical
Reed–Muller codes [16].
4.2 The strong trap code
We present a modified version of the trap code, which we call the strong trap code. Contrary
to the regular trap code, which appends 2t trap qubits, the strong trap code only appends
a single |0〉 trap and a single |+〉 trap. These two traps are subsequently encoded using a
quantum error-correcting code that has the desired properties described above, resulting in a
ciphertext of the same length as the original trap code.
I Definition 12 (Strong trap code). Let (Ei)i∈N be a weight-sparse family of weakly self-dual
CSS codes with parameters [[n(i), 1, d(i) = Ω(
√
n(i)]] and benign distance Ω(
√
n(i)). Then
the ith strong trap code {Vi,k}k∈Ki encodes m = 1 qubit using t = 3n(i)− 1 tags with the
unitaries Vi,k := pikE⊗3i H2n(i)+1 (where H2n(i)+1 = I⊗2n(i) ⊗ H⊗ I⊗(n(i)−1)).
5 A function f(x) is negligible in x if for all c ∈ N, there exists an x0 such that for all x ≥ x0, f(x) < x−c.
This definition is extended by stating that a function f(x) is negligible in another function g(x) if for
all c ∈ N, there exists an x0 such that for all x ≥ x0, f(x) < (g(x))−c.
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The strong trap code invokes two layers of security: the CSS codes Ei, which detect low-
weight attacks, and the traps |0〉 and |+〉, which detect higher-weight attacks by revealing
bit and phase flips, respectively.
One can verify that computing on quantum states authenticated with the strong trap
code works in much the same way as for the original trap code. For details, see [6].6
I Theorem 13. The strong trap code is a strong-purity-testing code with error negl(n(i)).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary i and non-identity Pauli P` ∈ P3n(i)\{I⊗3n(i)}. Let wx and wz
denote the X-weight and Z-weight (respectively) of P`, and note that max(wx, wz) > 0.
We bound the probability that P`′ := pi†kP`pik remains undetected by the code Ei and the
traps. Because Ei is a CSS code, it detects X and Z errors separately: let us write P`′ = PxPz
with Px ∈ {I,X}⊗3n(i) and Pz ∈ {I,Z}⊗3n(i), and focus first on the probability that Px remains
undetected, i.e., the probability that H2n(i)+1(E†i )⊗3PxE⊗3i H2n(i)+1 ∈ P1 ⊗ {I,Z}⊗3n(i)−1.
Because of the permutation pik, Px is a random Pauli in {I,X}⊗3n(i) with weight wx.
(Note that Pz is also a random Pauli with weight wz, but is correlated with Px: any overlap
in the locations of X and Z operators in P` is preserved by the permutation.)
Consider all possible values of wx = w1 + w2 + w3, where w1 denotes the weight of Px
on the first (data) codeword, w2 the weight on the second (|0〉-trap) codeword, and w3 the
weight on the third (|+〉-trap) codeword:
If wx = 0, then the Pauli Px is identity, and remains undetected with probability 1.
If 0 < wx < d(i), then 0 < wj < d(i) for at least one j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Ei detects an error on
the jth block with certainty, since the weight of the error is below the distance and the
benign distance.
If d(i) ≤ wx ≤ 3n(i)− d(i), the attack Px will likely be detected on the second block, the
|0〉-trap. We can be in one of four cases:
w2 > 0 and Px is detected in the second block by the CSS code Ei.
w2 > 0 and Px acts as a logical operation on the second block. Since Px consists of
only I’s and X’s, this logical operation can only be an X by the construction of CSS
codes. In this case, Px is detected by the projection that checks whether the trap is
still in the |0〉 state.
w2 > 0 and Px acts as a stabilizer on the second block, and remains undetected on
that block. However, by the weight-sparsity of the code family, the probability that
this is the case is negligible in n(i).
w2 = 0. In this case, Px acts as identity on the second block. The probability that
this case occurs, however, is small:
Pr
k
[w2 = 0] =
(2n(i)
wx
)(3n(i)
wx
) < (23
)wx
≤
(
2
3
)d(i)
. (15)
The first inequality holds in general for binomials, and the second one follows from the
fact that wx ≥ d(i). Since d(i) = Ω(
√
n(i)), this probability is negligible in n(i).
In total, the probability of the attack remaining undetected for d(i) ≤ wx ≤ 3n(i)− d(i)
is negligible in n(i).
6 For some applications, authenticating through measurement (cf. [6, Appendix B.2]) can be very useful.
Our underlying code has all the requirements to achieve this in principle, but in this work we focus on
quantum authentication and do not formulate the full security notions needed to properly describe this
scenario.
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If 3n(i)− d(i) < wx < 3n(i): as in the second case, there is at least one j ∈ {1, 2, 3} such
that n(i)− d(i) < wj < n(i), causing the attack to be detected (recall that X⊗3n(i) is a
logical X, and therefore this mirrors the 0 < wx < d(i) case).
If wx = 3n(i), then the logical content of the second block, the |0〉-trap, is flipped. This
is detected with certainty as well.
We see that unless wx = 0, the Pauli Px remains undetected only with probability negligible
in n(i). A similar analysis can be made for Pz: it is always detected with high probability,
unless wz = 0. We stress that these probabilities are not independent. However, we can say
that
Pr
k
[Px and Pz undetected] ≤ min
{
Pr
k
[Px undetected], Pr
k
[Pz undetected]
}
, (16)
and since at least one of wx and wz is non-zero, this probability is negligible in n(i). J
5 Simultaneous encryptions with key reuse
Earlier work on key reuse for quantum authentication deals explicitly with key recycling, the
decision to reuse (part of) a key for a new encryption after completing the transmission of
some other quantum message. The key is reused only after the honest party decides whether
to accept or reject the first message, so recycling is a strictly sequential setting.
If Construction 1 is instantiated with a strong-purity-testing code (such as the strong trap
code), the resulting scheme is able to handle an even stronger, parallel, notion of key reuse.
As long as the one-time pads are independent, it is possible to encrypt multiple qubits under
the same code key while preserving security. Even if the adversary is allowed to interactively
decrypt a portion of the qubits one-by-one, the other qubits will remain authenticated. This
property is especially important for the strong trap code: computing on data authenticated
with the strong trap code requires all qubits to be encrypted under the same permutation
key.
The original trap code is secure in this setting (as long as the one-time pads are fresh; see
Section 5.2 of [6]), but only if all qubits are decrypted at the same time. If some qubits can
be decrypted separately, the adversary can deduce the location of the |+〉 traps by applying
single-qubit X operations to different ciphertexts at different locations, and observing which
ones are rejected. Repeating this for the Z operator to learn about the |0〉 traps, the adversary
can completely break the authentication on the remaining qubits.
Suppose we encrypt two messages using an authentication scheme based on a strong-
purity-testing code {Vk0}K0 , using the same code key k0 but a fresh one-time pad. If we then
decrypt the first message, the scheme is still QCA-R-authenticating on the second message
with only slightly worse security.
I Theorem 14 (informal). Let (Encrypt,Decrypt) be an ε-QCA-R-authenticating scheme
resulting from Construction 1, using a strong-purity-testing code {Vk0}K0 . Let M1,M2 denote
the plaintext registers of the two messages, C1 = M1T1, C2 = M2T2 the corresponding
ciphertext registers, and R a side-information register. Let A1, A2 be arbitrary adversarial
channels. Consider the setting where the adversary acts on the qubits, encrypted with keys
k0, k1, k2, as
DecryptC2→M2k0,k2 ◦A
M1,C2,R
2 ◦DecryptC1→M1k0,k1 ◦A
C1,C2,R
1 ◦
(
EncryptM1→C1k0,k1 ⊗ EncryptM2→C2k0,k2
)
,
so that the key k0 is used for both messages. Then, the scheme is 2ε-QCA-R-authenticating
on the second qubit.
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Sketch. As a first step, we rewrite the encryption of the second qubit as using encoding
and teleportation, by using the equivalence between applying a random quantum one-time
pad and teleporting a state. The encryption of the second qubit can then be thought of as
happening after decryption of the first qubit. Next, we apply QCA-R security of the first
qubit, where we are using the property that k0 is recycled both in the accept and the reject
case. Finally we undo the rewrite and can directly apply QCA-R security on the remaining
state. J
The complete proof can be found in the full version. The argument easily extends to any
polynomial number of authenticated qubits.
6 Conclusion
We presented a new security definition, QCA-R, for ciphertext authentication with key
recycling, and showed that schemes based on purity-testing codes satisfy quantum ciphertext
authentication, while strong purity testing implies both ciphertext authentication and key
recycling. This is analogous to the security of quantum plaintext-authentication schemes
from purity-testing codes [5, 15].
Additionally, we constructed the strong trap code, a variant of the trap code which is a
strong-purity-testing code and therefore is QCA-R secure (as well as secure under all notions
of plaintext authentication). This new scheme can strengthen security and add key-recycling
to earlier applications of the trap code. It is also applicable in a wider range of applications
than the original trap code, because encrypted qubits remain secure even if other qubits
sharing the same key are decrypted earlier.
A potential application of the strong trap code is the design of a quantum CCA2-secure
encryption scheme (as in [3, Definition 9]) that allows for computation on the encrypted
data. By only using the pseudo-random generator for the one-time-pad keys, and recycling
the key for the underlying error-correcting code, this security level could be achieved.
As future work, our definition of QCA-R could be generalized in different ways. First, one
can consider a variant of the definition in the abstract-cryptography or universal-composability
framework, in order to ease the composition with other cryptographic primitives. Second,
because it can be useful to authenticate measurements in delegated computation applications,
one could extend the definition of QCA-R to deal with the measurement of authenticated data.
We expect no real obstacles for this extension of the definition, and refer to [6, Appendix B.2]
for comparable work on the original trap code.
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